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This paper canvasses a new approach to protecting Indigenous peoples that
targets the institutions that financially sponsor the development projects and
companies that can often harm Indigenous livelihoods. To revitalize and
protect their communities and legal systems, Indigenous peoples must
reckon with the power of financial markets. Encouragingly, through the
movement for socially responsible investment, which has had earlier
successes such as its campaign against investment in apartheid South
Africa, some financiers are beginning to respect Indigenous rights and
interests. Some mutual funds remove companies that violate Indigenous
rights from their investment portfolios, while other investors seek change
through shareholder activism. Much more needs to be done, however, if SRI
is to have an impact. Some states have started to introduce informational
and incentive based policy mechanisms to promote SRI, which may
eventually enable the financial sector to be a source of support rather than
an obstacle to Indigenous self-determination.
I IMAGINING A NEW APPROACH
Imagine the following scenarios. First, a bank declines to finance a mining
company owing to concerns that its mine poses unacceptable risks to the
environment of Indigenous peoples. Then, a pension fund divests from
agricultural businesses that misuse Indigenous land. Further, a mutual fund
boycotts a lucrative pharmaceutical company that infringes on Indigenous
medicinal knowledge. In this picture, these decisions are normal, everyday
occurrences in the financial world.
If all this were true-not just in the realm of imagination-Indigenous
peoples would presumably be in a much better position to revitalize their
communities and legal systems. Aboriginal title, resource rights, self-
government, and other familiar indicia of Indigenous self-determination are
necessary but insufficient conditions for revival. The state is not the sole
source of power to reckon with. Indigenous right-holders must also contend
with markets and the business sector. Land rights lose some of their lustre
where capital markets decline to invest in Indigenous communities and
thereby hinder economic development. Conversely, mining or energy
companies financed by international banks may take advantage of an
indigent First Nation to profit from environmentally and culturally
problematic development on their territory.
Such was the plight of many peoples in the so-called "developing
countries" of Africa, Latin America and other regions whose hopes for
prosperity in the wake of decolonization were dashed. The inequalities of a
world economic system that denies them fair trade, access to capital
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resources and control over their economic policy have left many of these
people destitute.' Post-colonial scholarship has illuminated how attainment
of formal political sovereignty may obfuscate an ongoing, and often veiled,
oppression of the developing world by new and unequal economic relations.2
Starting from the premise that Indigenous peoples must not ignore the
impact of the business sector on their prospects for self-determination, this
article focuses on the financial sector and the potential of the socially
responsible investment ("SRI") movement to provide a pathway for
revitalization of Indigenous communities. First Nations should not see their
relationship to the state as the only means for obtaining recognition and
protection of their cultural and legal interests. Indigenous peoples must also
reckon with the financial sector such as banks and pension funds, which play
a pivotal role in sponsoring economic development that may harm or benefit
First Nations. Presently, financial institutions are generally not regulated for
the social and environmental impacts of the projects and companies they
support. However, through the SRI movement, financiers are beginning to
pay attention to human rights and sustainable development. Whether SRI
can achieve sufficient influence without new forms of regulation is
debatable however.
II THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: A LEVIATHAN TO RIVAL THE STATE
Finance Capitalism
Through its extensive investments worldwide, the financial sector has
become a leviathan. Incongruously, that pervasive power has not been
matched by increased public accountability. Indeed, the financial sector's
growth is partly a direct result of government policy to deregulate and
I. See S. George, A Fate Worse Than Debt (London: Penguin Books, 1990); I. Wallerstein,
"Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within
the Capitalist World Economy" (1974) 17 African Studies Rev. 1; S. Amin, Unequal
Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1976); R.P. Buckley, "International Capital Flows, Economic
Sovereignty and Developing Countries" Y.B. of International and Financial Law (London:
Kluwer Law, 1999) at 17.
2. See G. Rai an & R. Mohanram, eds., Postcolonial Discourse and Changing Cultural Contexts
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995); P. Williams & L. Chrisman, eds., Colonial
Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader (New York: Longman, 1994).
No. I
Indigenous Law Journal
liberalize financial markets.3 Environmental protection and social justice
hardly feature in contemporary financial regulation. Financial institutions
remain generally legally unaccountable for the social and environmental
sequelae of their investments. Yet, as the financial sector sponsors and
profits from economic development, it arguably should share accountability
for the impacts of that development on Indigenous peoples and their
interests.
The function of a financial system is essentially to distribute capital
from actors with surpluses to those with shortages.4 Financial institutions
play a crucial mediating role in circulating capital. Behind the development
activities of "ordinary" corporations (and often governments too), financial
institutions such as banks and mutual funds supply the capital necessary for
economic activity.5 The finance sector is thus essentially where wholesale
decisions about future development begin.
Institutional investors now rival or exceed governments in the financial
resources they command, marking an era of "finance capitalism."6 Finance
capitalism has entailed the ceding of sovereignty to financial markets,
particularly through deregulation of financial activities,' growing corporate
demand for external financing, and granting more power to fund managers,
credit-rating agencies and other intermediaries. Finance capitalism reflects a
shift in the power of the corporation away from managers to shareholders
and institutional investors who represent them. They are concentrating
formerly dispersed shareholders with ownership stakes unknown since the
great industrialists of the 1 9 t
h century. Some critics view this trend as the
greatest threat to our democratic institutions.8 Others such as Stephen Davis
welcome it, because to him as pension plans and mutual funds are invested
3. Other factors include technology advances, underlying income growth, and demographic
changes resulting in more savings for retirement: P.L. Davies, "Institutional Investors in the
United Kingdom" in D.D. Prentice & P.R.J. Holland, eds., Contemporary Issues in Corporate
Governance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at 69, 72-73; H. Blommestein & N. Funke,
"Introduction to Institutional Investors and Institutional Investing" in OECD, ed., Institutional
Investors in the Neu, Financial Landscape (Paris: OECD, 1998) at 15-16.
4. R.G. Hubbard, Money, the Financial System, and the Economy (New York: Pearson/Addison-
Wesley, 2005).
5. J. Corbett & T. Jenkinson, "How is Investment Financed: A Study of Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States" (1997) 65:1 Manchester School Supplement 69.
6. L. Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
7. World Bank, Financial Deregulation: Changing the Rules of the Game (Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 1992) (e.g., removal of interest-rate controls, fewer restrictions on foreign
investment, and the removal of regulations segmenting financial service markets).
8. N. Hertz, The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy (New York:
Free Press, 2002); E. Toussiant, Your Money or Your Life: The Tyranny of Global Finance
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005).
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on behalf of millions of beneficiaries, to whom they owe fiduciary duties,
they are surreptitiously democratizing corporate ownership. 9
Indigenous Peoples in the Financial Economy
The finance sector affects Indigenous peoples in two primary ways. First, it
finances specific projects and companies that bring changes to Indigenous
livelihoods. In recent years, various large infrastructure projects financed by
banks have wrought great harm to Indigenous peoples in their vicinity."°
Such projects include Ok Tedi mine (Papua New Guinea), Freeport mine
(Indonesia), Narmada dam (India), Jabiluka mine (Australia) and Sakhalin II
pipeline (Russia). For instance, the expansion of Freeport mine was,
according to BankTrack, "only made possible by a massive capital raising
campaign, in which banks underwrote new equity shares and bonds, and lent
hundreds of millions of dollars in general purpose loans."' ' Within Canada,
some of the big banks have also been implicated in financing forestry and
mining companies on unceded Aboriginal lands. 2 Too often lenders only
belatedly and defensively consider the impacts of such ventures when
protests and other actions create reputational risks and expensive delays for
them.
The second way the finance sector threatens Indigenous peoples is more
diffuse and harder to quantify. The finance sector, as the handmaiden of
capitalism, helps propagate values in the development process that are
controversial for Indigenous peoples.13 Certainly, First Nations have a long
history of forced or consensual adaptation to markets and trading.14 Such
9. S. Davis, J. Lukomnik & D. Pitt-Watson, The New Capitalists. Ho, Citizen Investors Are
Reshaping the Corporate Agenda (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006) at 3-6.
10. E.g., C. Ballard & G. Banks, "Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining" (2003) 32
Annual Review of Anthropology 287; W.F. Fisher, "Going Under: Indigenous Peoples and the
Struggle Against Large Dams" (1999) 23:3 Cultural Survival Quarterly 29; A. Gedicks, The
Ne, Resource Wars: Native and Environmental Struggles Against Multinational Corporations
(Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 1993).
11. Letter from Johan Frijns, Coordinator, on behalf of the BankTrack network, to Dr. John
Ruggie, United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative on Human Rights &
Business, "The Role of the Financial Services Sector in Respecting Human Rights" (18
December 2006), online: BankTrack <http://www.banktrack.org> at 3.
12. Forest Action Network ("FAN"), Banking Can Be This Destructive (British Columbia: FAN,
2001) at 11.
13. J. Nash, "Indigenous Development Alternatives" (2003) 32 Urban Anthropology and Studies
of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development 57; Chun-Chieh Chi, "Capitalist
Expansion and Indigenous Land Rights: Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Taiwan"
(2001) 2:2 Asia Pac. J. Indigenous Land Rights 1444.
14. E.g., A.J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).
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adaptation has often been costly, bringing unwelcome cultural change.15
Consider, for instance, the stark differences in the environmental values
between Indigenous cultures and Western capitalist societies. In contrast to
the instrumental and utilitarian views of nature in industrial capitalism,
Indigenous peoples traditionally saw themselves as part of the community of
nature, aware that misuse of the environment would inevitably reverberate
and harm their livelihoods. 6 As Indigenous peoples have become
increasingly drawn into a world market, where Indigenous lands and
resources are conscripted into economic development servicing global
needs, these environmental values have weakened. 7
Unacceptably, existing international laws concerning Indigenous
peoples ignore the financial sector. The International Labour Organisation
("ILO") Convention No. 169 (1989)18 and United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2006)'" both disregard financial and corporate
sectors. This is a curious omission for instruments otherwise pioneering for
their putative recognition of Indigenous peoples as an international legal
personality. By failing to impose a responsibility on business to respect
Indigenous rights, the ILO Convention and UN Declaration conceptualize
international legal obligations conservatively. These instruments blithely
assume that the behaviour of business is simply a matter for states to
supervise and need not concern international law-makers.20
Indigenous peoples themselves at times also fail to appreciate the
influence of those financing developments that threaten their livelihoods.
15. The resistance of many Indigenous peoples to the appropriation and commercialization of their
traditional knowledge is one example. For example, the 1993 Mataatua Declaration on the
Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples states: "Commercialisation of
any traditional plants and medicines of Indigenous peoples must be managed by the Indigenous
peoples who have inherited such knowledge. A moratorium on any further commercialisation
of Indigenous medicinal plants and human genetic materials must be declared until Indigenous
communities have developed appropriate protection mechanisms": online, Alaska Native
Knowledge Network <http://www.ankn.uafedu/IKS/mataatua.html> at clauses 2.6-2.8.
16. See A. Dunning, Guardians of the Land: Indigenous Peoples and the Health of the Earth
(Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 1992); T. Inglis, ed., Traditional Ecological
Knowledge: Concepts and Cases (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1993).
Though, there is some evidence to the contrary, suggesting Indigenous people's association
with ecological degradation: T. Flannery, The Future Eaters (Auckland: Reed Books, 1995).
17. B.J. Richardson & D. Craig, "Indigenous Peoples, Law and the Environment" in B.J.
Richardson & S. Wood, eds., Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2006) 195 at 200.
18. ILO Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent
Countries, 27 June 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force 5 September 1991).
19. UN Doc. A/HRC/I/L.10 (30 June 2006).
20. Large transnational corporations can yield more economic resources and power than some
nation-states: see D.C. Korten, When Corporations Rule the World (Bloomfield, Conn.:
Kumarian Press, 1995); S. Beder, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism
(White River Junction, Vt.: Chelsea Green, 1998).
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Their protests typically do not take them to the boardrooms of international
banks or pension funds. Instead, they tend to vent their concerns where
threats seem to physically materialize, such as the mining site. Or they
petition government regulators wrongly perceived as in charge.21 For
instance, Indigenous peoples challenged the Sakhalin Island pipeline being
constructed in eastern Russia by blocking roads leading to the oil and gas
facility projects.22 These tactics are much like other civil societal groups,
though there is evidence of increased NGO campaigning directly against
financial institutions.23
III SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
Socially responsible investment, also known as ethical investment, considers
the social, environmental and ethical consequences of providing financial
capital to companies. By focusing on the financial market aspect of
development, SRI promises a novel way to achieve social justice for
Indigenous peoples. SRI is, in effect, a form of market governance, whereby
ethical financial institutions attempt to discipline companies needing funds
by setting social and environmental standards.
SRI rejects the traditional conceptualization of financial markets as
amoral, driven only by economic rationality. From the 1700s, the Quakers
were the first among many religious groups to eschew investments in sin
businesses connected to slave trade or producing intoxicants.24 During the
1970s and 1980s, faith-based investors also led campaigns to boycott
companies doing business in apartheid South Africa.25 Today, SRI has
matured beyond church-based activism with single-issue concerns, into a
broad agenda for socially and environmentally responsible financing. 6
Though growing quickly, the SRI sector nonetheless has captured only a
small market; it averages just 3-5 per cent of the investment market in major
21. A. Gedicks, Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to Mining and Oil Corporations (Cambridge,
Mass.: South End Press, 2001); B.J. Cummings, "Dam the Rivers; Damn the People:
Hydroelectric Development and Resistance in Amazonian Brazil" (1995) 35:2 Earth and
Environmental Science 151.
22. "Sakhalin Indigenous People Blockade Oil Development" Environment News Service (30 June
2005), online: <http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jun2005/2005-06-30-02.asp>.
23. See especially S. Waygood, Capital Market Campaigning: The Impact of NGOs on
Companies, Shareholder Value and Reputational Risk (London: Risk Books, 2005).
24. See J.R. Soderlund, Quakers and Slavery: A Divided Spirit (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1985).
25. W. Kaempfer, J. Lehmen & A. Lowenberg, "The Economics of Anti-Apartheid Investment
Sanctions" (1987) 68:3 Social Science Quarterly 528.
26. R. Sparkes, "A Historical Perspective on the Growth of Socially Responsible Investment" in R.
Sullivan & C. Mackenzie, eds., Responsible Investment (Sheffield: Greenleaf, 2006) at 39.
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economies, thus limiting its ability to influence change.27 But, if SRI became
a mainstream approach to financing, financial markets might contribute
significantly to social justice for Indigenous peoples, among other causes.
SRI is practised by a diversity of institutions.28 Faith-based investors
such as the Church of England and the Methodist Church remain significant
ethical investors.29  The U.S.-based Interfaith Center on Corporate
Responsibility ("ICCR") is the world's leading institution for interfaith
collaboration on SRI. 3" Some occupational pension funds, especially in the
public sector and among trade unions, have emerged as ardent social
investors." Banks and credit unions have begun to promote community
investing and responsible project financing. The SRI sector has also
expanded from the institutional to the retail sector, with a proliferation of
specialist ethical mutual funds marketed to the general public.32 Finally,
some micro-finance institutions dedicated specifically to Indigenous peoples
have been established.
The methods of SRI are as diverse as its agenda. Investors rely primarily
on screens to exclude companies involved in activities considered by the
financier as inappropriate, or to actively select businesses involved in
practices perceived as particularly desirable.3 Alternatively, the "best of
sector" method chooses firms that perform best in their sector according to
specified indicators. Another SRI methodology commits financiers to
consider social and environmental issues if perceived as financially
"material." Materiality arises when a company's social and environmental
27. Social Investment Forum ("SIF"), 2005 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the
United States: A 10-Year Reviewv (Washington, D.C.: SIF, January 2006); European Social
Investment Forum ("EUROSIF"), Socially Responsible Investment among European
Institutional investors (Paris: EUROSIF, 2003).
28. For an overview, see M. Jeucken, Sustainable Finance and Banking: The Financial Sector and
the Future of the Planet (London: Earthscan, 2001); S. Labatt & R.R. White, Environmental
Finance: A Guide to Environmental Risk Assessment and Financial Products (London: John
Wiley and Sons, 2002).
29. N. Kreander, K. McPhail & D. Molyneaux, "God's Fund Managers: A Critical Study of Stock
Market Investment Practices of the Church of England and UK Methodists" (2004) 17:3
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 408.
30. See their web page, online: <http://www.iccr.org/about>.
31. K. Murrmann, J. Shaffer & R. Wokutch, "Social Investing by State Public Employee Pension
Funds" (1984) 35:6 Lab. L.J. 360; J. Quarter, et al., "Special Investment by Union-Based
Pension Funds and Labour-Sponsored Investment Funds in Canada" (2001) 56:1 Industrial
Relations 92.
32. C. Cowton, "The Development of Ethical Investment Products" in A. Prindl & B. Prodhan,
eds., Ethical Conflicts in Finance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
33. See P. Kinder, S. Lydenberg & A. Domini, The Social Investment Almanac (New York: Henry
Holt, 1992); R. Sparkes, The Ethical Investor (New York: HarperCollins, 1995).
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performance poses risks and liabilities or may improve financial returns.34
Finally, some investors deliberately target problematic businesses to change
them from within. Through corporate engagement and shareholder action, a
financier may actively lobby and use equity voting rights and other sources
of influence to push the business to improve its environmental and social
performance."
One concern is that while the SRI movement is increasingly advocating
respect for Indigenous rights, First Nations are typically not significant
participants in the movement, let alone financial markets. Where they are
without significant assets of their own, or are unwilling to commercialize
their resources, First Nations must hope that SRI institutions heed their
actual concerns and interests.
IV SRI FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Opportunities and Constraints
Indigenous peoples should be a quintessential SRI cause as they elicit both
human rights and environmental concerns. Indigenous land rights have
cultural significance and relevance for environmental stewardship, for
instance. Misuse of Aboriginal land can have severe social and ecological
consequences when the Indigenous custodians are displaced.36 They should
therefore appeal equally to investors sensitive primarily to human rights and
social justice, as well as investors preoccupied with ecological and
sustainable development problems.
Socially responsible investors began to acknowledge Indigenous rights
in the 1980s, coinciding with the multilateral development banks' initial
policies to manage the impacts of their loans on tribal and other local
peoples. While intergovernmental banks continue to develop their policies,
mutual funds and pension plans, private financiers are forging other ways to
respect Indigenous rights.
Compared to other SRI causes, however, Indigenous rights generally
garner less attention from investors. Historically, responsible investment was
driven by an ecclesiastical agenda, tied to avoiding the sins of tobacco,
34. Brokerage House Analysts, The Materiality of Social Environmental and Corporate
Governance Issues to Equity Pricing (Geneva: United Nations Environment Programme
Finance Initiative, 2004).
35. A.K. Prevost & R.P. Rao, "Of What Value Are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public
Pension Funds?" (2000) 73:2 Journal of Business 177; A. Lewis & C. MacKenzie, "Support
for Shareholder Activism among U.K. Investors" (2000) 24:3 Journal of Business Ethics 167.
36. R. Howitt, Rethinking Resource Management: Justice, Sustainability and Indigenous
Peoples (London: Routledge, 2001).
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gambling, alcohol and pornography.37 While SRI is outgrowing its religious
roots, Indigenous rights must now share a crowded field of SRI causes
including climate change, armaments and child labour. Climate change
attracts vastly more media attention than other issues, and therefore carries
greater reputational risks for investors.38 Financiers may also perceive
Indigenous peoples as an idiosyncratic, country-specific concern rather than
of global significance. 9 Even in jurisdictions with Aboriginal populations,
investors have tended to treat Indigenous rights as a relatively low priority
compared to corporate governance, market conditions and other seemingly
more pressing economic matters.4"
Another constraint to SRI for Indigenous peoples is that investors may
lack accurate and reliable information on which to base investment
decisions. According to Baue:
Accessibility to information is the biggest challenge in applying [Indigenous
peoples'] rights screens. The areas are remote and getting accurate information
is expensive and difficult. Even where information is available, there may be
questions on the credibility or reliability of such information.
41
To the extent that investors heed Indigenous peoples, they are driven
principally either by the financial risks or benefits at stake, or by ethical and
social justice imperatives.
Financial risks and benefits are manifold. Companies that respect human
rights gain reputational advantages and protect brand image. Companies'
access to natural resources can improve through friendly relations with
Indigenous landowners. Firms that exploit Indigenous people's knowledge
and resources without consent risk resistance and litigation.42 Such conduct
may also incur loss of preferred business partner status in competitive
tendering. The social licence gained from working cooperatively with
Indigenous peoples can give companies competitive market advantages.
37. Sparkes, supra note 26 at 39.
38. Association of investment Companies, Press Release, "Most Investors Concerned about the
Climate" (16 March 2007); J. Leggett, "Climate Change and the Banking Industry: A Question
of Both Risk and Opportunity" (1996) 179 Bankers Magazine 25.
39. Personal communication, investment advisor, London, U.K. (27 February 2007).
40. J. Tippet, "Investors' Perceptions of the Relative Importance of Investment Issue" (2000) 24:3
Accounting Forum 278 (discussing the low profile of Aboriginal rights among Australian
investors).
41. W. Baue, "The Emergence Story behind Indigenous Peoples Rights Screens" Institutional
Shareouvner (10 June 2004), online: <http://www.institutionalshareowner.com/news/article.cgi
?sfArticleld-1439>.
42. E.g., I. Mgbeqii, Global Biopiracy: Patents, Plants, and Indigenous Knowledge (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2006); G. Manners, "Unresolved Conflicts in Australian
Mineral and Energy Resource Policies" (1992) 158:2 Geographical Journal 129.
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The case of Platinex, a Canadian mining exploration company,
epitomizes the risks to companies and their investors when they disregard
Indigenous interests. Platinex suffered a costly setback in 2006 when it tried
to intimidate the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation ("KIFN") by
suing them for a preposterous CAD$10 billion and attempting to have KIFN
members barred from protesting at Platinex's drilling sites. In Platinex v.
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation,4" the Ontario Superior Court
of Justice granted KIFN an interlocutory injunction prohibiting Platinex
from exploration on lands subject to KIFN's ongoing claims. Judge Smith
accepted that Platinex faced severe financial problems and possibly
bankruptcy if not granted the injunction it sought. But he faulted Platinex for
unilateral actions that were "disrespectful" of KIFN's interests and for being
the author of its own financial misfortune by understating to investors its
problems gaining access to the drilling site.44
Ethical compulsions to respect Indigenous peoples are similarly diverse
and complex. The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility explains in
its Principlesfor Global Corporate Responsibility (1999) that: "by virtue of
their inherent rights, [Indigenous peoples] are entitled to full participation in
the business decisions which pertain to their ancestral lands and their way of
life."45 Likewise, the preamble of the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples proclaims: "Recognizing the urgent need to respect and
promote the inherent rights of [I]ndigenous peoples which derive from their
political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual
traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands,
territories and resources."46 The ethical case is thus rooted in notions of
social justice and the right of vulnerable peoples to self-determination.
Multilateral Development Banks
Multilateral development banks ("MDBs"), which finance economic
projects and programs in developing countries, were the first financial
institutions to adopt policies to address the impacts of their loans on
Indigenous peoples.47 The rationale of these policies was both for the MTDBs
to deflect public criticisms about the insensitivity of project financing to the
43. (2006), 272 D.L.R. (4th) 727.
44. Platinex and the Ontario government have since appealed this ruling.
45. Section 1.4P8. Prepared with other NGOs; available online: Bench Marks <www.bench-
marks.org/downloads/Bench / 20Marks / 20- / 20full.pdf>.
46. Supra note 19.
47. See A. Gray "Development Policy, Development Protest: The World Bank, Indigenous
Peoples and NGOs" in J.A. Fox & L.D. Brown, eds., The Struggle for Accountability: The
World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (Boston: MIT Press, 1998) at 267.
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plight of Indigenous peoples, coupled with a belief that these peoples,
because of their isolation and acculturation status, tended to be especially
"vulnerable" in the development process. Therefore, the MDBs introduced
procedures to help design projects that minimize adverse social impacts.
The World Bank took the lead with an operational policy on Indigenous
peoples adopted in 1982.48 This led to Operational Directive 4.20 ("OD
4.20") in 1991, which was revised in 2005 in the form of Operational Policy
and Bank Procedure on Indigenous Peoples 4.10 ("OP/BP 4.10"). The latter
decreed a procedure for an assessment of a proposed project's effects on
Indigenous peoples; consultation with affected peoples; and preparation of a
plan to minimize impacts on Indigenous peoples. 49 Any consequential loan
contract would need to incorporate the government borrower's obligations to
adhere to measures relating to Indigenous peoples. 5 0 In some cases, OP/BP
4.10 contemplates that project financing may hinge on the legal recognition
of Indigenous people's land rights, equitable sharing of the benefits of
commercial development and consent to the development of cultural
resources and knowledge.5  Though OP/BP 4.10 does not explicitly
recognize Indigenous people's rights, through covenants included in loan
agreements, the World Bank can influence states' treatment of Indigenous
peoples. 2 Apart from the ODs, in 2003 the World Bank launched a Global
Fund for Indigenous Peoples in developing countries. It supports
implementation of culturally appropriate projects and programs for
sustainable development, and assists the operations of the UN Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Peoples.
3
In practice, implementation of the World Bank's Indigenous-related
policies has been erratic.14 Disagreements about who is Indigenous and
borrower resistance to what is perceived as interference in its internal
political affairs have both impeded implementation of the policy. 5 Many
World Bank and other MDB-financed projects such as dams, highways and
48. World Bank, Tribal Peoples in Bank-Finances Projects, Operational Manual Statement 2.34
(February 1982). See F. McKay, "The Draft World Bank Operational Policy 4.10: Progress or
More of the Same?" (2005) 22 Ariz. J. of Int'l & Comp. L. 65.
49. World Bank, ibid. at para. 1. McKay, ibid., provides an excellent summary of an earlier draft of
this policy, and related concerns.
50. World Bank, ibid. at para. 11.
51. Ibid. at para. 8(a).
52. G.A. Sarfaty, "The World Bank and the Internalisation of Indigenous Rights Norms" (2005)
114 Yale L.J. 1791 at 1796.
53. See online: World Bank, "Indigenous Peoples" <http://www.worldbank.org/indigenous>.
54. Sarfaty, supra note 52 at 1802, concludes that the World Bank Operations Evaluation
Department report in 2003 "found that only 55 of the 89 projects (or about 62% of the projects)
that could have potentially affected Indigenous peoples (as determined by the OED's




forestry projects have been implicated in the displacement of Indigenous
communities and degradation of their environment. 6 Apart from the quality
of implementation, many Indigenous peoples remain skeptical of OP/BP
4.10's policy of "free and informed consultation," rather than "free and
informed consent.
'57
Other international banks, such as the Asian Development Bank
("ADB") and the Inter-American Development Bank ("IADB") have issued
policies addressing Indigenous peoples. 5 The ADB's Policy on Indigenous
Peoples (1998) provides for adoption of an "Indigenous Peoples
Development Plan." The Plan must ensure that "a project negatively
affecting [I]ndigenous peoples [is] appropriately redesigned to mitigate
negative effects, or include[s] an acceptable compensation plan."5 9 The
policy does not require Indigenous people's free, prior and informed consent
to developments. The IADB's Strategy for Indigenous Development (2006)
contains similar measures to avoid or mitigate adverse impacts of Bank
operations on Indigenous peoples and their rights.60
Private Sector SRI
SRI Screens
As explained earlier, an SRI screen can serve to exclude investments
(companies or entire economic sectors) deemed undesirable or to favour
investments that meet particular ethical, social or environmental
benchmarks. Among mutual funds marketed to retail investors, relatively
few offer policies that explicitly screen companies for their stance towards
Indigenous peoples.
The U.S.-based Calvert Group, one of the largest families of mutual
funds in the world, has one of the most detailed Indigenous screens. It
professes:
56. C. McDowell, ed., Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequences of Development-
Induced Displacement (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996); Fisher, supra note 10.
57. For an overview of the debates, see M. Satterthwaite & D. Hurwitz, "The Right of Indigenous
Peoples to Meaningful Consent in Extractive Industry Projects" (2005) 22:1 Ariz. J. Comp. &
Int'l L. 1.
58. See C. Charters, "Indigenous Peoples and International Law and Policy" (2007) 18:1 Pub. L.
Rev. 22.
59. Asian Development Bank ("ADB"), The Bank's Policy on Indigenous Peoples (Manila: ADB,
1998) at para. 37.
60. Inter-American Development Bank ("IADB"), Strategy for Indigenous Development (New
York: IADB, 2006) at para. 5.1.
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We avoid companies that have a pattern and practice of violating the rights of
Indigenous Peoples. We will not invest in companies for which we have
verifiable or clear evidence of egregious practices towards Indigenous Peoples.
We value companies that have adopted policies and programs respecting
Indigenous Peoples. We invest in companies that positively portray all peoples,
including [I]ndigenous or ethnic peoples and their religious and cultural
heritage.6'
These are not empty words. In 1999 Calvert ceased investment in the U.S.
energy company Calpine due to concerns about its proposals to mine
geothermal energy in the sacred Medicine Lake Highlands in California.62 In
2002 Calvert also divested from Liz Claiborne, the sportswear company,
citing concerns from Indigenous peoples about the company's misuse of the
name "Crazy Horse" (the famous Lakota Sioux chief) on some of its
apparel. Calvert's divestment won applause from the American Indian
Coalition on Institutional Accountability." But, like many SRI decisions,
Calvert lacked sufficient market clout to influence Liz Claiborne, which
continues to flaunt the Crazy Horse label.64
Calvert's stance on Indigenous rights is rare among investors. A survey
of major SRI funds in Australia in 2001 found that only two of 15 funds
examined screened specifically for Aboriginal land rights.6 According to the
Natural Capital Institute's statistics of approximately 110 SRI funds in the
U.S. and Canada, 81 funds did not screen for Indigenous rights at all, while
28 funds used a positive screen.6 One would expect to find even lower
levels of interest among investors in jurisdictions without Aboriginal
denizens. Of course, investors may incidentally capture Indigenous rights via
a general "human rights" screen in the absence of a specific Indigenous
policy.
A few public sector investors have adopted SRI policies that address
Indigenous peoples. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund was
established in 2006 with an SRI mandate. The Fund's "Ethical Guidelines"
61. See online: Calvert: Mutual Funds that Make a Difference <http://www.calvert.com/pdf/6132
.pdf>.
62. M. LeBeau, "LeBeau: Protecting the Sacred Medicine Lake Highlands" Indian Country Today
(3 December 2004), online: <http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfmid-1096409955>.
63. International Indian Treaty Council, "Calvert's Divestment from Liz Claiborne Praised by
Indigenous Leaders" (17 October 2002), online: <www.treatycouncil.org/new-page 524111
.hitm>.
64. See online: Liz Claiborne <http://www.lizclaibomeinc.com/ourbrands/brand crazy.asp>.
65. U. Trog, SRI Socially Responsible Investment (Sydney: Eco Design Foundation, 2001) at 5-6,
online: The Eco Design Foundation, Resources <http://www.changedesign.org/Resources/EDF
Publications/Articles/Papers/SRI.pdf>.




advise that the Fund: "should not make investments which constitute an
unacceptable risk that the Fund may contribute to unethical acts or
omissions, such as ... serious violations of human rights."67 In 2006 the
Fund decided to divest from Freeport, owing to its mining project in
Indonesia implicated in significant environmental and social impacts on
local Indigenous tribes.6" The New Zealand Superannuation Fund is also
obliged by legislation to invest ethically. Though its official "responsible
investment" policy does not refer specifically to Indigenous peoples
(surprising given the high visibility of Maori in New Zealand),69 the fund's
policies are broad enough to encompass them.7"
Shareholder Activism
Another SRI strategy depends on shareholder activism to encourage
companies to adopt policies and practices that respect the rights of
Indigenous peoples. Investors who buy shares in public companies acquire
voting and other rights that in theory allow them to influence company
affairs.
To illustrate, the Ethical Funds Company (Canada) in 2006 filed a
shareholder resolution against Enbridge, a natural gas supply business. The
resolution responded to Enbridge's plans to build the Gateway Pipeline in
British Columbia through territory subject to outstanding Aboriginal land
claims. The resolution stated:
RESOLVED THAT:
The Board to prepare a report (at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary
information) by September 1. 2006 assessing the impacts of company
operations on ecosystems claimed by First Nations. This report should
describe:
1. Environmental impact assessment procedures, including assessment
of cumulative impacts on biodiversity
2. Risk assessments detailing how current and proposed company
operations may be impacted by First Nations land claims;
67. Issued 22 December 2005 pursuant to regulation on the Management of the Government
Pension Fund (2004), online at: <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/andre/
Ethical -Guidel ines-for-the-Government-Pension-Fund---G oba -/The-Ethical -Guidel ines.html?
id-434894>.
68. Nordic Region Pensions and Investment Neivs (20 June 2006), 12.
69. S. 61(d), Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001.
70. Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation, Statement of Investment Policies, Standards,
Procedures (Auckland: Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation, Sept. 2006) at 21-23.
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This shareholder resolution was eventually withdrawn after Enbridge
management agreed to address the concerns raised by Ethical Funds, First
Nations and other parties.72 Even when such resolutions are deliberated, a
failure to muster a majority of votes does not render such efforts futile when
they serve to prod corporate management into informal dialogue and, at best,
an eventual policy change.
Another example is Trillium Asset Management, a U.S. investment
company, which pledges to avoid companies having "demonstrated a pattern
of disrespectful or exploitative behavior" towards Indigenous peoples and,
"if problems emerge at a company in which we are already invested, we will
engage with management in dialogue to determine if the company is
committed to changing its behavior and redressing past wrongs.1173 Trillium
will divest as a "last resort, to be used only if dialogue and shareholder
proposals fail to have a positive impact upon corporate behavior."'77 For
example, in 2001 Trillium filed resolutions for the 2001 annual meetings of
BP, Chevron and ExxonMobil, calling for a modification of drilling in the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge that threatened the livelihoods of Gwich'in
and Inupiat communities.
In Canada, Amnesty International has assisted the Grassy Narrows First
Nation in Ontario to resist clear-cut logging on their ancestral lands by the
forestry behemoth Weyerhaeuser. In an open letter to the company's
investors, Amnesty garnered support for a shareholder resolution filed by
Capital Strategies Consulting in 2007 requesting that Weyerhaeuser assess
the feasibility of suspending its purchases of wood fibre derived from the
disputed forestry area until Grassy Narrows gives informed consent to
further logging.76 The dispute has a long history but previous tactics, such as
site blockades and legal actions challenging licences granted to
Weyerhaeuser, have failed to halt the logging of the area's ecologically
71. Detailed at <http:/www.amnesty.ca/campaigns/sharepower/enbridge resolution.php>.
72. Ethical Funds, "The Ethical Funds Company Focus List for the 2006 Shareholder Action
Program", online: <http://www.ethicalfunds.corndo the right thing/sri/focuslist/General2006
.asp>.
73. Trillium Asset Management, Pamphlet, "Indigenous Rights: Our Work on Social and
Environmental Issues" (2003), online: <http://www.trilliuminvest.com/pdf/tamc-indigenous
11-03.pdf>.
74. Ibid.
75. Trillium Asset Management, "Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: At Risk" (2001), online:
<http://www.trilliuminvest. com/pages/activism/activism issuedetail. asp?IssuelD-20>.
76. T. Scurr, "Open Letter from Amnesty International (Canada) to Socially Responsible Investors
with Shares in Weyerhaeuser," Amnesty International (11 April 2007).
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significant Boreal forest." While Weyerhaeuser attempted to muzzle
activists at its April 2007 shareholder meeting, and the resolution attracted
only 5 per cent of the vote, the dispute continues to simmer unabated.
78
Similar conflicts between socially conscious investors and resource
developers over Indigenous rights have flared. In May 2007 an alliance of
NGOs and Aboriginal activists disrupted the Toronto shareholder meeting of
Barrick, the world's largest gold mining company. 79 Barrick has an atrocious
record against Indigenous inhabitants of areas it mines in Australia, the U.S.,
Chile and other jurisdictions."
Community Finance
Community finance, also known as "micro-finance," constitutes a third SRI
process potentially beneficial to Indigenous peoples. While the causes of
poverty in Indigenous communities are complex and wide-ranging, one
factor contributing to low levels of economic development in many
communities is insufficient access to credit and capital for small business
development and other economic endeavours."' Private sector financial
institutions provide insufficient support to Indigenous communities.
Encouragingly, First Nations have a solution in Indigenous-controlled,
locally operated financial institutions, constituted as credit unions or
community banks for example. There were some 25 community finance
institutions dedicated specifically to Native Americans in the U.S. in 2003.2
For example, the Hopi Credit Association is a tribal credit union linking
banks and tribal borrowers by raising funds from banks and administering
loan selection and servicing.83 In Australia, a First Nations Australian Credit
Union serves a similar role.84 In Canada, the National Aboriginal Capital
Corporation Association ("NCCA") assists its member network of
77. Further details at Free Grassy Narrows <http://freegrassy.org>.
78. Amnesty International, Press Release, "Share Power: Weyerhaeuser Mills Wood Logged from
Grassy Narrows without Consent" (30 April 2007).
79. See <http://www.protestbarrick.net>.
80. CorpWatch, Barrick's Dirty Secrets: Communities Worldwvide Respond to Gold Mining's
Impacts (San Francisco: CorpWatch, May 2007).
81. Community Development Financial Institutions ("CDFI") Fund, The Report of the Native
American Lending Study (Washington, D.C.: CDFI Fund, 2001); S. McDonnell & N.
Westbury, "Banking on Indigenous Communities: Issues, Options, and Australian and
International Best Practice", CAEPR Working Paper No. 18/2002 (Centre for Aboriginal
Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, 2002).
82. S. Dewees, Investing in Community: Communiy Development Financial Institutions in Native
Communities (Kyle, South Dakota: First Nations Oweesta Corporation and First Nations
Development Institute, 2004) at 9.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid. at 9.
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Aboriginal financial institutions in providing customized financial products
and services to Aboriginal business communities. 5
Community financiers differ from mainstream banks in several ways.
While they are market-driven, community finance institutions fill niches
overlooked by other lenders. They offer credit to those ignored by
conventional banks,86 and provide services that help ensure that credit is
used effectively, such as financial literacy training and credit counseling to
customers, and technical assistance to small businesses. Their specialized
knowledge of the communities they cater to and the closer relationships they
form with their customers facilitates individualized and specialized financial
products and procedures. Regular banks often see these services as too
costly to administer. Banks prefer standard cost-effective programs in high
demand and geared towards the general market. Cost-cutting among banks
has also led to branch closures, to the detriment of remote Indigenous
communities."
Despite these differences, some mainstream commercial lenders are
belatedly providing banking services and credit tailored to the needs of First
Nations. In Canada, the Bank of Montreal has operated an Aboriginal
Banking Unit since 1992.8 It has opened branches on Indian reserves and
provides various home ownership programs for eligible First Nations people
living on reserves where conventional loan security cannot be readily
provided, and banking products for Aboriginal businesses. 9 Similar
Aboriginal banking units have been established in several other Canadian
banks including the Royal Bank of Canada9 and the Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce. 9' The Toronto Dominion Bank has also, in conjunction
with Saskatchewan First Nations, set up an affiliated First Nations Bank
with customized personal and business products and services. 2 It should be
borne in mind that Canadian banks would perhaps be less willing to assist
First Nations were it not for government guarantees for some lending
schemes.
85. See online: <http://www.nacca.net>.
86. For example, most Indian land in Canada and the U.S. is held in trust by the government,
which hinders the use of land as collateral for loans, particularly housing loans.
87. McDonnell & Westbury, supra note 81 at 7 (discussing branch closures in Australia).
88. Bank of Montreal, "Aboriginal Business Unit", online: <http://www4.bmo.com/aboriginal
banking/0,2284,35649 975756,00.html?pChannelld-244704>.
89. C. McLaughlin, "BMO Relates to Aboriginal Goals" (Spring 2007) Windspeaker Business
Quarterly 22.
90. See online: <http://www.rbcroyalbank.comI/RBC:RbOeyY7lA8UAAI-CYiA/aboriginal/init
.html>.
91. See online: <http://www.cibc.com/ca/small-business/aboriginal/philosophy.html>.
92. See online: <http://www.firstnationsbank.com/index.jsp>.
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V SRI GOVERNANCE FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Introduction
The foregoing examples of responsible financing to protect Indigenous
peoples are relatively uncommon. Though growing quickly, the SRI sector
nonetheless has captured only a small market. Before SRI can become
mainstream, financial markets must be reformed to remove the various
economic and institutional barriers to SRI.9 Investment managers often lack
sufficient information about the social and environmental effects of their
loans and investments to inform asset selection and engagement with
companies. They also face incentives to maximize short-term financial
returns at times at the expense of broader social well-being. And some types
of investment managers face legal and institutional barriers to sacrificing
profits for ethical causes.
Encouragingly, some new voluntary and official standards for
governance of investment have facilitated the growth of SRI. Often
organized transnationally, these forms of governance furnish both
substantive standards for responsible finance and procedures for more
transparent, accountable decisions.94 They represent mainly a form of private
law, where market and civil societal institutions supply most of the
governing norms. This ensemble of regulation incorporates provisions to
respect the interests of Indigenous peoples. While the use of these
mechanisms is mostly voluntary, for some investors, the question is no
longer whether to adhere to these mechanisms, but how to apply them.
Private codes of conduct and other market-generated ordering reflect a
shift to pluralistic systems of governance.95 Braithwaite and Fisse contend
that market regulation works when firms are concerned about their
reputations and where it helps forestall "the less palatable alternative" of
government regulation." Others remain skeptical that voluntary mechanisms
93. See B.J. Richardson, "Sustainable Finance: Environmental Law and Financial Institutions" in
B.J. Richardson & S. Wood, eds., Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford: Hart, 2006)
at 309.
94. See D. Leipziger, The Corporate Responsibility Code Book (Sheffield: Greenleaf, 2003); 0.
Perez, "The New Universe of Green Finance: From Self-Regulation to Multi-Polar
Governance" in 0. Dilling, M. Herberg & G. Winter, eds., Responsible Business: Self-
Governance in Transnational Economic Transactions (Oxford: Hart, 2007) [forthcoming].
95. See B. Krumsiek, "Voluntary Codes of Conduct for Multinational Corporations: Promises and
Challenges" (2004) 109:4 Business and Society Rev. 583.
96. J. Braithwaite & B. Fisse, "Self-Regulation and the Control of Corporate Crime" in C.D.
Shearing & P.C. Stenning, eds., Private Policing (London: Sage, 1987) at 221, 222.
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provide a viable means of social regulation.9 Voluntary measures may pre-
empt regulation to forestall meaningful change.9" Voluntary measures are
vulnerable to free riding, whereby some non-participating businesses exploit
the benefits of a voluntary regime without contributing to its costs.99 For
example, although many public and private financial institutions refused to
help participate in China's Three Gorges Dam project-which displaced
many people-some banks did not share these negative views and stepped in
to provide necessary loans. "0'
The following discussion examines the provisions regarding Indigenous
peoples in the Equator Principles, UN Norms on the Responsible
Investment, SRI Stock Market Indices, as well as some national level
instruments. Unlike ILO Convention No. 169 or the UN Declaration on
Indigenous Peoples, these governance mechanisms speak directly to
companies and investors. These are not the only transnational governance
standards applicable to SRI. Others include the United Nations Environment
Programme's Finance Initiative," 1 and the (UN) Principles of Responsible
Investment."°2 However, this article discusses only those codes of conduct
that refer explicitly to Indigenous peoples. Neither ILO Convention No. 169
nor UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples targets the financial
sector as a means to protect Indigenous peoples. 103
Equator Principles
The Equator Principles ("EPs"), drafted in 2003 and substantially revised in
2006, provide a voluntary code of conduct for responsible project
financing.' °4 Banks that sign the EPs agree to implement measures to
minimize the social and environmental harm of financed infrastructure
97. See A. Neale, "Organising Environmental Self-Regulation: Liberal Govermmentality and the
Pursuit of Ecological Modemisation in Europe" (1997) 6 Environmental Politics 1; I. Maitland,
"The Limits of Business Self-Regulation" (1995) 27:3 California Management Rev. 132.
98. OECD, Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD,
1999) at 31-38.
99. Ibid., at 40-42, 99.
100. C. Wright & A. Rwabizambuga, "Institutional Pressures, Corporate Reputation, and Voluntary
Codes of Conduct: An Examination of the Equator Principles" (2006) 111:1 Business and
Society Rev. 89.
101. See online: <http://www.unepfi.org>.
102. See online: <http://www.unpri.org/principles>.
103. The closest the UN Declaration comes to addressing financial issues is Article 39, which
provides: "Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and technical
assistance from States and through international cooperation, for the enioyment of the rights
contained in this Declaration".
104. See online: <http://www.equator-principles.com>.
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projects (e.g., dams, highways and mines).1"5 The principles come from the
policies of the World Bank's International Finance Corporation ("IFC"), the
private sector lending arm of the World Bank group. Though the EPs were
drafted by the banking industry, they arose from pressure from institutional
investors like the Calvert Group and demands from NGOs including the
Worldwide Fund for Nature. 106
The EPs expect signatory banks to follow procedures for undertaking
environmental and social impact studies before disbursing money, and to
consult with potentially affected communities. The EPs apply to projects of
a total capital cost exceeding US$10 million. Before drawing on the loan,
the borrower must covenant with the lender to comply with any social and
environmental standards derived from the procedures decreed by the EPs.
Concerning Indigenous peoples, the EPs require project sponsors to
assess and limit potential impacts on Indigenous lands and communities. For
projects considered to pose the most significant impacts (category A
projects), signatory banks must ensure "that the borrower or third party
expert has consulted, in a structured and culturally appropriate way, with
project affected groups, including [I]ndigenous peoples.
10 7
If the project proceeds, the sponsoring bank must require borrowers to
formulate an "Indigenous people's development plan" in accordance with
the IFC Performance Standard 7. This standard provides, in part:
When avoidance [of adverse impacts] is not feasible, the client will minimize,
mitigate or compensate for these impacts in a culturally appropriate manner.
The client's proposed action will be developed with the informed participation
of affected Indigenous Peoples and contained in a time-bound plan. such as an
Indigenous Peoples Development Plan.'08
The EPs do not, however, require borrowers to obtain the free, prior
informed consent ("FPIC") of affected Indigenous communities, even
though this standard has been recognized in international law. The lesser
standard of "consultation" does not require developers to respond to and
address the advice or concerns of Indigenous peoples. Unlike a consultation
process, FPIC is a two-way, interactive negotiation that offers affected
communities more input in decision-making, and is more likely to result in
culturally appropriate developments.
105. T. O'Riordan, "Converting the Equator Principles to Equator Stewardship" (2005) 47:4
Environment 1.
106. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Banking on Responsibility (London: Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer, July 2005) at 7.
107. Principle 5.
108. International Finance Corporation ("IFC"), "Performance Standard 7: Indigenous Peoples"
(Washington, D.C.: IFC, April 2006) at clause 8.
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Where adverse impacts are anticipated, the EPs expect borrowers to take
the following steps."°9 First, the client will offer affected communities at
least compensation (cash or in-kind) equivalent to those who hold full legal
title to land under national laws. Further, the client must consider feasible
alternative project designs to avoid the relocation of Indigenous peoples. If
such relocation is unavoidable, the client must not proceed with the project
unless it first negotiates in good faith with the affected communities.
Of approximately 45 banks that had pledged themselves to the EPs as of
late 2006, only five had policies that explicitly address Indigenous
peoples." ° JPMorganChase, with the best policy, according to the NGO
watchdog Banktrack, commits itself to finance projects only where free,
prior informed consultation using customary institutions results in support of
the project by the affected Indigenous people; Indigenous people have been
fully informed about the project; they have access to a grievance
mechanism; and major Indigenous land claims have been appropriately
addressed.111  Commendable as these aims appear on paper, even
JPMorganChase has been dogged by criticisms by some NGOs, such as for
its participation in a financial syndicate to support a controversial oil
pipeline through tribal lands in Ecuador." 
2
UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
The proposed UN Norms also compel businesses, specifically transnational
corporations ("TNCs"), to respect Indigenous rights.1 3 The Norms in fact
potentially may apply to a range of firms including investment companies
and other financial intermediaries. They address environmental standards,
labour standards and consumer protection. In contrast to the Equator
Principles, the UN Norms purport to be legally binding if adopted by states.
109. Ibid.
110. The banks are ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Citigroup, HSBC and JPMorganChase: A.
Durbin, et al., Shaping the Future of Sustainable Finance: Moving from Paper Promises to
Performance (London: Worldwide Fund for Nature and BankTrack, 2006) at 27.
111. JPMorganChase, "Environmental Policy", s. 4; online: <www.jpmorganchase.com/cm/cs?
pagename-Chase/Href&urlname-jpmc/community/env/policy/indig>.
112. "Ecuador: New Oil Pipeline Threatens Fragile Ecosystems and Communities from Amazon
Rainforest to Pacific Coast", online: World Rainforest Information Portal <http://www
.rainforestweb.org/pages/ocp.php>.
113. ECOSOC, Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 [Norms]. For an historical perspective
of the Norms, see D. Weissbrodt & M. Kruger, "Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights"
(2003) 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 901.
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The UN Norms posit safeguards for Indigenous people, not least the
strong guarantee of non-discrimination and the inclusion of a general
commitment to respect cultural rights. '4 They stipulate:
[T]ransnational corporations and other business enterprises have the obligation
to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect
human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including the
rights and interests of Indigenous peoples.'' 5
The official Commentary on the Norms elaborates on how companies should
consider Indigenous rights. Companies should respect the principle of free,
prior and informed consent of communities affected by development
projects.116  The Commentary also advises companies to not evict
communities "without having had recourse to, and access to, appropriate
forms of legal or other protection pursuant to international human rights
law.
,117
The UN Norms incorporate several procedural requirements to
strengthen implementation.'" In addition to the responsibilities of states," 9
the Norms expect TNCs to "adopt, disseminate and implement internal rules
of operation," and "to periodically report" 2 ' on their progress "to all relevant
stakeholders." '121 Importantly, TNCs are further compelled to "apply and
incorporate [the] Norms in their contracts or other arrangements and
dealings" with almost any and every party with whom they do business.'22
Where their contracting partners violate these terms, TNCs must "cease
doing business with them."' 23 Thus, in an unprecedented way, the UN Norms
impose international legal obligations directly on TNCs which include
financial companies.
But such a radical departure from previous intergovernmental attempts
to govern TNCs has come at a price. The UN Commission on Human Rights
114. Ibid., articles 10 and 12.
115. Ibid., article A. I.
116. Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises iwith Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2
(2003) at article E.10(c).
117. Ibid.
118. Part H.
119. The UN Norms direct states to "establish and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative
framework" to facilitate their implementation (article 17).
120. S. 15.
121. Commentary, s. 15(a).
122. S. 15.
123. Commentary, s. 15(c).
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in early 2005 declined to endorse the Norms.124 The International Chamber
of Commerce and other business groups criticized the Norms as shifting the
obligation to protect human rights from governments to private
companies. 125
Even though the UN may never formally adopt the Norms, some SRI
institutions are beginning to refer to them in their shareholder resolutions
and proxy voting guidelines.'26 The Interfaith Center for Corporate
Responsibility, which coordinates SRI among religious investors, is one of
several to endorse the UN Norms.
127
SRI Stock Market Indexes
A third type of international governance mechanism for SRI that may help
encourage investors to consider Indigenous peoples is the specialist SRI
stock market index. Generally, market indexes serve to track price
fluctuations of their listed securities. This enables comparison of stock
values of selected corporate shares over time. An SRI index is distinctive in
that it includes only firms that meet specified environmental and social
criteria, with a view to tracking the financial robustness of the sector. Each
index provider has its own criteria and methods for collecting data on
companies' performance.
Several major international stock exchanges have now introduced SRI
indexes to cater to investors wishing to construct an investment portfolio
based on the leading responsible firms. Two such indexes are the Dow Jones
Sustainability Indexes ("DJSI")128 and the London Stock Exchange's
FTSE4Good Index Series.'29 The FTSE4Good Index provides that a
company must have "a stated commitment to respecting [lI]ndigenous
peoples' rights. ' 130 It makes no other reference to Indigenous peoples. The
124. ECOSOC, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises ivith Regards to Human Rights, 2005, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/91.
125. C. Hillemanns, "UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights" (2003) 10:4 German L.J. 1065 at 1068.
126. E.g. Ethical Funds Company, "Proxy Voting Guidelines, at: <www.ethicalfunds.com/pdf2/sri/
proxyvotingguidelines.pdf>.
127. Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, "Submission by ICCR's Human Rights
Working Group to the UN High Commission on Human Rights" (24 September 2004), online:
<http://www.iccr.org/news/ press releases/2004/pr hrwgsubmiss100704.htm>.
128. See online: <http://www.sustainability-indexes.com>.
129. See online: <http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4GoodIndex Series>.
130. Financial Times Stock Exchange ("FTSE"), FTSE4Good Index Series: Inclusion Criteria
(London: FTSE, 2006) at 5.
Vol. 6
Protecting Indigenous Peoples
DJSI factors the protection of rights of Indigenous peoples in the narrow
category under labour standards, providing that companies will be assessed
against "Labor Practice Indicators; e.g., cases involving discrimination,
forced resettlements, child labour and discrimination of [I]ndigenous people;
workplace accidents and occupational health and safety."
131
While it is encouraging to see treatment of Indigenous peoples
recognized as a global standard of corporate responsibility, the criteria in
SRI indexes seem too shallow to serve as a meaningful guide to appropriate
behaviour. Nonetheless, some companies have been de-listed for failure to
meet standards; the FTSE4Good Index removed the mining giant Freeport in
2005, citing concerns with environmental impacts of its Indonesian
operations.1 3 ' According to the FTSE4Good Index annual review, "Global
resource companies have improved considerably on policies for
[I]ndigenous peoples rights."'' Unlike the DJSI, the FTSE4Good Index
provider has a policy to actively engage with companies, to improve their
behaviour, rather than merely to passively monitor their social and
environmental performance. 1
3 4
Criteria and rules that govern inclusion of a company in each index help
to improve the integrity of the SRI market and thus its capacity to influence
companies in their dealings with Indigenous peoples. Responsible investors
may rely on such indexes as a means of picking companies that comply with
the investor's policies on treatment of Indigenous peoples. According to the
FTSE, its SRI indexes help "investors to navigate through the plethora of
corporate social responsibility ("CSR") codes and standards around the
world."'135 Further, the ultimate membership selections of SRI indexes
constitute an instrument of market ordering. Companies seeking competitive
advantages from association with a prestigious index are disciplined to
adhere to the criteria for membership. A 2004 study of the impact of the
FTSE4Good on corporate behaviour suggested it had had some impact on
internal operations of listed companies, especially on their reporting, policy
decisions and management systems.' 6
131. Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, World Indexes Guide (Zurich: DJSI, August 2006) at 14.
132. FTSE, Semi-Annual Review of the FTSE4Good Indices (London: FTSE, Sept. 2005) at 2.
133. FTSE, Criteria Development and Company Engagement Programme (London: FTSE, 2005) at
1.
134. Personal communication, Ethical Investment Research Service (22 February 2007), London,
U.K.
135. FTSE, "FTSE4Good Index Series Factsheet" (London: FTSE, 2006).
136. G. Cobb, et al., "FTSE4Good: Perceptions and Performance" (Paper presented to the Seventh
Alternative Perspectives on Finance Conference, Stockholm University, 8-10 August 2004).
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National Laws for SRI
Recently, there has arisen a modicum of legal reforms to promote SRI
nationally. Governments have favoured informational and economic
incentive policy instruments.137 While none of these legal mechanisms
address Indigenous peoples specifically, broad references to human rights or
environmental policy can include them.
Pension fund legislation in the U.K. and several other European
countries, and Australia, obliges fund administrators to disclose whether
they invest with regard to social and environmental standards.138 However,
disclosure regulations neither define what constitutes SRI nor do they
require pension funds to disclosure how they implement policies if enacted.
Surveys of the implementation of the SRI disclosure regulation found a large
increase in SRI policies among pension funds on paper, but often accepted
perfunctorily.' 9 Anecdotal evidence suggests some funds' policies make
reference to Indigenous peoples. For instance, in Australia, the Catholic
Super and Retirement Fund discloses that it excludes investment in
companies that "do not appropriately consult on [N]ative title issues." 4 ' The
policy however sheds no light on how this standard is implemented.
For banks, two legal mechanisms may promote SRI. Imposing joint
liability on lenders for the social and environmental harms of their borrowers
can have a very sobering effect, encouraging more cautious lending. The
higher rates of interest passed on to borrowers can encourage them to reduce
their environmental and social impacts. In the U.S., banks' behaviour was
profoundly influenced by the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),"' which potentially made
lenders vicariously liable for cleanup of lands contaminated by firms they
financed. 42 Indian tribes have used CERCLA to obtain compensation for
137. B.J. Richardson, "Diffusing Environmental Regulation through the Financial Services Sector:
Reforms in the EU and other Jurisdictions" (2003) 10:3 Maastricht J. of European and Comp.
L. 1; B.J. Richardson, "Financing Environmental Sustainability: A New Role for the Law" in
S. Benn & D. Dunphy, eds., Corporate Governance and Sustainabilty: Challenges for Theory
and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006) 122.
138. B.J. Richardson, "Pensions Law Reform and Environmental Policy: A New Role for
Institutional Investors?" (2002) 3:5 J. Int'l Fin. Markets: Law and Regulation 159.
139. D. Wheeler & J. Thomson, Comparative Study of U.K. and Canadian Pension Fund
Transparency Practices (Ottawa: NRTEE, 2004); C. Berger, Disclosure of Ethical
Considerations in Investment Product Disclosure Statements: A Revieiw of Current Practice in
Australia (Melbourne: Australian Conservation Foundation, 2004).
140. Catholic Super and Retirement Fund ("CSFR"), Allocated Pension Fund Product Disclosure
Statement (Burwood: CSFR, 2006) at 14.
141. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Star. 2767 (11 December 1980), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601.




cleanup of contaminated tribal lands.143 Lender environmental liability has
also been of concern, albeit to a lesser extent, in some other jurisdictions.14 4
Another legal mechanism to encourage more responsible banking is
community financing legislation, whereby lenders must help meet the
financial needs of the local communities in which they are chartered. A
notable U.S. example is the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.145 It aims
to improve the credit services of low-income and minority communities, and
to ensure the availability of low-cost banking services for low-income
households and small businesses.146 The Act also requires that banks, whose
annual turnover exceeds a certain threshold, to reinvest into registered
community programs. The U.S. Community Development Financial
Institutions Act of 199414 is another community financing instrument,
designed to provide government support to businesses that can revitalize
distressed communities. Both pieces of community financing legislation
have helped Indigenous communities to finance economic development.148
Governments have also encouraged private lending to Indigenous peoples by
providing financial guarantees, thereby eliminating the risks for banks, and
hence their willingness to provide services.149
Economic incentives are another policy mechanism to promote SRI.
Taxation concessions and similar subsidies for socially and environmentally
friendly investments provide tangible monetary incentives for SRI. The
Netherlands has provided taxation concessions since 1995 through its Green
Investment Directive. 15' The tax breaks are offered to funds that invest at
143. E.g., Berrey v. Asarco Inc., 2006 W.L. 401822 (10th Cir. 2006). CERCLA actually treats
Indian tribes as states, thereby giving tribes the opportunity to assume primary enforcement
responsibility of this legislation on tribal lands. J.V. Royster, "Environmental Protection and
Native American Rights: Controlling Land Use through Environmental Regulation" (1991) 1
Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 89 at 94.
144. J. Lipton, "Project Financing and the Environment: Lender Liability for Environmental
Damage in Australia" (1996) 11 J.I.B.L. 7; H. Thompson, "The Impact of Environmental Law
on the Lending Industry in Canada", in G. Thompson, M. McConnell & L. Huestis, eds.,
Environmental Law and Business in Canada (Aurora: Canada Law Books, 1993) at 409-453.
145. Pub. L. No. 95-128; 91 Stat. 1147 (12 October 1977), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2901.
146. J.T. Campen, "Banks, Communities and Public Policy" in G.A. Dymski, et al., eds.,
Transforming the U.S. Financial System: Equity and Efficiency for the 21 Century (ME
Sharpe, 1993), 221.
147. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4701.
148. McDonnell & Westbury, supra note 81 at 19-20.
149. For instance, Canada's Department of Indian Affairs provides loan guarantees to help finance
housing on Indian reservations: see online: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada <www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca!ps/hsg/cih/hs/amm e.html>. There are more extensive loan guarantee programs in
the U.S.: M. Fogarty, "Bankers See Commercial Loan Opportunity on Reservations" Indian
Country Today (25 July 2006), online: <www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id-
1096413355>.
150. M. Jeucken, Sustainable Finance and Banking: The Financial Sector and the Future of the
Planet (London: Earthscan, 2001) at 92-94.
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least 70 per cent of their assets in government-approved projects. Research
vindicates the Dutch scheme in generating more SRI; a study by KPMG
found that between 1996 and 2002, the scheme had resulted in Euro 2.8
billion of investment in over 2,100 projects.151 While none of these projects
dealt with Indigenous peoples, there is no reason why this precedent could
not be adapted to provide tax incentives for investments in projects of
benefit to Aboriginal communities.
Ethical investors also need reliable and timely information about how
companies treat Indigenous peoples if they are to make such behaviour a
criterion of investment. Banks can use contract law mechanisms to demand
such information from borrowers. But equity investors must rely on public
reporting pursuant to company and securities legislation, which usually does
not require disclosure of a firm's social or environmental performance
unless considered financially "material."'52 Legislation is gradually requiring
businesses to be more open about their social and environmental activities,
and mandatory reporting for this purpose has been instituted in France, the
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, for instance.'53 While corporate non-
financial reporting laws cannot be expected to be so detailed as to
specifically refer to Indigenous peoples, current examples are sufficiently
broadly cast to arguably include issues affecting Indigenous peoples.
Reform of corporate governance, to enable more active shareholder
participation in corporate decision-making, is also helpful to SRI.
Shareholder proposals sponsored by institutional investors are a key means
by which financiers can influence company policy.154 As discussed earlier,
some resolutions have dealt with the treatment of Indigenous peoples. But in
some jurisdictions, significant barriers to shareholder activism persist, such
as proxy context rules and election of boards of directors. 55 Company law
reforms in some jurisdictions are gradually helping to improve the prospects
for shareholder activism. Another regulatory approach targets institutional
investment managers themselves, requiring them to be more accountable in
their exercise of voting and other shareholding rights. For instance,
151. KPMG, Sustainable Profit: An Overview, of the Environmental Benefits Generated by the
Green Funds Scheme (London: KPMG, 2002) at 6.
152. E.I.A.G. Geltman, "Disclosure of Contingent Environmental Liabilities by Public Companies
under the Federal Securities Laws" (1992) 16 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 129 at 144.
153. KMPG, International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting (London: KPMG, 2005) at
40-42.
154. See D. Del Guercio & J. Hawkins, "The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism"
(1999) 52 J. Financial Economics 293.
155. For instance, before 2003, shareholders in Canadian companies could not file resolutions
promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes": Canada
Business Corporations Act, 1975, s. 137.
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Canadian and U.S. law requires mutual funds to publicly disclose their proxy
votes and voting policies. 56
The final notable area of regulation conducive to SRI places obligations
on investment managers to actually take social and environmental impacts
into account as part of their fiduciary investment duties. This has only
occurred for public sector pension and social security funds. The Swedish,
Norwegian, New Zealand and French national pension schemes are
statutorily required to invest responsibly.'57 As mentioned earlier, it was
pursuant to such legislative standards that the Norwegian pension fund
divested from Freeport, citing concerns about the impact of its mine on an
environment inhabited by Indigenous peoples.' As progressive as
mandatory SRI might seem, it would be too politically controversial for
governments to extend such requirements to private sector financiers for
now.
VI CONCLUSION
This article advocates a new approach to the protection of Indigenous
peoples by targeting the business community, in particular investment
institutions whose responsibility derives from the way they sponsor and
profit from economic development. Traditional legal measures to address the
plight of Indigenous peoples, such as land rights and self-government are
likely to be insufficient in a world where economic development is
controlled substantially by the private sector. Encouragingly, the SRI
movement is starting to champion Indigenous peoples and their rights. Yet,
because the market for SRI remains small, and voluntary mechanisms of SRI
governance such as the Equator Principles may lack legitimacy and
influence, some supplementary public regulation of financiers to promote
SRI seems inevitably necessary.
While we likely need more public governance for SRI, it entails a very
different role for the state than that traditionally associated with law
pertaining to Indigenous peoples. Land rights, self-government agreements,
protection of traditional knowledge, and other familiar measures will always
156. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, 17 C.F.R. Parts 239, 249, 270, and 274 (31 January 2003); Canadian
Securities Administrators, National Instrument 81-106, Investment Fund Continuous
Disclosure (May 2004).
157. B.J. Richardson, "Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder Socially Responsible
Investment?" (2007) 22:2 B.F.L.R. 145 at 195-96.
158. Supra note 67.
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be central in furthering the interests of Indigenous peoples. But their
effectiveness can be enhanced with a likeminded financial sector.
Financiers can help protect Indigenous peoples by ceasing to fund
developments that harm their environment and culture, and by improving
access to capital resources for First Nations to allow them to pursue their
own economic development priorities and to reduce their dependency on
government. Financiers are starting to behave more responsibility towards
Indigenous peoples through pressure from NGOs, First Nations themselves
and ethical investors.
But governments themselves must be challenged to make the financial
sector more accountable. Some policies and laws are already in place, such
as informational and incentive mechanisms to encourage responsible
financing. But they leave too much discretion to financiers. For example,
rather than merely require investment institutions to disclose whether they
have an SRI policy, governments should require public disclosure of how
such policies are implemented. Lenders could also be required to consult
with potentially affected Indigenous communities and to withhold finance
until all social and environmental impact studies have been completed and
concerns addressed. The state itself can set a better example by requiring
public financial institutions such as national pension plans to consider the
interests of Indigenous peoples in their investment decisions. And, critically,
governments must work with First Nations to ensure that international law
sets rigorous standards for the financial sector in its dealings with
Indigenous peoples.
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